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This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation
and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2-
strategy games. We then introduce a new formalism of quantum evolutionary dynamics, and give an example
where an evolving quantum strategy gives reward if played against its classical counterpart.
Game theory [11] is a theory of decision making, which
provides mathematical tools for investigating situations in
which several parties make decisions according to their own
interests. In a game, each player aims at maximizing their
utilities or payoffs by choosing the best choice of strategies
they can offer. The last few decades witnessed several new
concepts of game theory, such as quantum games and evo-
lutionary games, attracting much attention among not only
game theorists, but also mathematicians, quantum physicists,
economists, biologists and computer scientists.
Quantum games proposed a new perspective for the solu-
tion of game theory. In a classical game, players draw a
mixed strategy from a probability distribution p. To modify
ones strategy, each player i is allowed to apply linear trans-
formation among her own part of probability vector pi. In
quantum games, however, players employ quantum strategies
instead of mixed strategies, over a larger set of quantum states
ρ in Hilbert space H. It has been shown that quantum strate-
gies lead to advantages over classical strategies in some par-
ticular game examples. For instances, Meyer [6] quantized a
coin tossing game and discovered that one may use quantum
strategy against his opponent’s classical strategy to win a high
utility with certainty. Eisert et. al. [2] proposed a new model
for 2-player 2-strategy games with entanglement by quantiz-
ing prisoner’s dilemma. Zhang [13] modified their model and
allowing arbitrary admissible local operations to each player,
and addressed a quantitative study on the increase of equi-
librium payoffs in quantum games. All previous results have
been restricted to static games, without considering any form
of dynamical strategy evolution.
Evolutionary game theory [8, 9, 12], innovated by the study
of biological evolution, does not rely on the assumption of
completely rational players but on the idea that Darwinian
process of natural selection [3] drives biological systems to-
wards optimization of future reproductive success [5]. John
Maynard Smith [8] was the first geneticist who tried to model
the dynamics of biological systems in terms of game theory.
He introduced a new concept called evolutionary stable strat-
egy to explain the distribution of different phenotypes within
biological populations [9]. Generally, given the set of differ-
ential equations of strategy dynamics, the equilibrium states
can be determined as the fixed points of the dynamical sys-
tem. One particular model describing how populations evolve
is called replicator dynamics, whose fixed points are found to
be Nash equilibria [7].
To begin with, we briefly review the notion of classical evo-
lutionary game by the following game example. Assume two
populations, Assyrian and Babylonian, are going to decide
whether to trade (T) or to farm (F) for their livings. Gener-
ally trading makes good profit, but both populations need to
cooperate (both choose T) in order to make successful trad-
ing, otherwise the one who performs trading earns nothing.
The payoffs to players according to their strategies pair are
determined by payoff matrices A and B (expression 1). No-
tice that the game is a symmetric game so payoff matrix B is
the transpose of A.
A =
[
1 0
0.5 0.5
]
; B = AT =
[
1 0.5
0 0.5
]
(1)
Now Assyrian and Babylonian play the game repeatedly. In
each stage, they have to decide how to distribute their people
into a mixed proportion of trading and farming. We called
their distributions of people as two mixed strategies ~x and ~y,
each is represented by a 2-dimensional probability vector over
strategies T and F. The game is equivalent to a finite-strategy
game that each player chooses strategy T or F according to
probability distribution ~x and ~y. The expected payoff of each
player is a bilinear function of ~x and ~y, given by uA = ~xTA~y
and uB = ~xTB~y.
A strategy pair (~x, ~y) is represented by a point in a 2-
dimensional affine subspace S in [0, 1]4. Assuming that the
time step between two stage games is infinitesimally small and
the game is played infinitely many times, the mixed strategies
~x(t) and ~y(t) can be treated as continuous vector functions
of time t. The product strategy is a time-dependent vector
~p(t) = ~x(t) × ~y(t) in the strategy space S, which trajectory
draws an evolution path of their mixed strategy distribution.
In this Trading-Farming game, here are 3 dynamical equi-
libria: both players choose T, both players choose F, or both
choose T with probability 1/2. We called the first two states as
pure equilibria (PE), and the third one as internal equilibrium
(IE), which is an equilibrium probability vector with no zero
entry. Since these 3 strategy pairs lead both players reach-
ing local optimal payoff, they would not have the intention to
modify their strategies once they reached one of the equilib-
rium states. On the contrary, if they are not using equilibrium
strategies in current stage, there exists an alternative strategy
for each player to earn more. As to maximize future payoffs, a
strategy evolves with time subject to payoff difference. There-
fore, the strategy evolution can be captured by certain kind of
evolutionary dynamics.
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2One of the most commonly mentioned evolutionary dynam-
ics is called replicator dynamics, which was well-established
by Bomze (1983) and applied to explain animal evolution be-
haviors [1]. Formally, following replicator dynamics, the evo-
lution of Assyrian’s and Babylonian’s strategy is determined
by the following differential equations:
dxi
dt
= γxi((A~y)i − ~xTA~y)
dyi
dt
= γyi((~x
TB)i − ~xTB~y)
Intuitively, if a pure strategy (say T) yields a better payoff
compared to the current mixed strategy ~x, Assyrian will grad-
ually expand the probability share of using T in proportion to
the payoff difference, where γ is the rate of evolution.
Below are some general properties of classical 2-player 2-
strategy evolutionary games. Generally, with payoff matrices
A =
[
a b
c d
]
and B =
[
a′ b′
c′ d′
]
, let the players employ mixed
strategies ~x = (x, 1 − x) and ~y = (y, 1 − y), so Assyrian
will choose T with probability x and Babylonian will choose
T with probability y. For every strategy pair (x, y), we let
~v(x, y) be a velocity vector function subject to replicator dy-
namics. For any 2-player 2-strategy game, there is at most
1 internal equilibrium. An internal equilibrium is uniquely
determined to be (x∗, y∗) = ( d
′−c′
a′−b′−c′+d′ ,
d−b
a−b−c+d ) if it ex-
ists. Based on its position, the probabilistic strategy space
can be divided into 4 quadrants, with the internal equilibrium
(x∗, y∗) locates at centre. We claim that for any two internal
points within the same quadrant, the sign of each component
of their velocity vectors should be the same. For any two in-
ternal points and located in different quadrants, their velocity
vectors have at least one component different in sign. These
properties can be shown by the bilinearity of the expected pay-
off function, where the payoff has to be monotonic increasing
or decreasing if we fix the strategy of one player. Thus it is
obvious that for any 2-player 2-strategy game without inter-
nal equilibrium, an evolving strategy will always collapse to
a state on boundary, which means at least one player ends up
with a dominant pure strategy by the end of evolution.
Next, we put forth our discussions to symmetric games. For
any 2-player 2-strategy symmetric game, the payoff matrices
can be expressed in 4 parameters as below:
A =
[
a b
c d
]
; B = AT =
[
a c
b d
]
(2)
In particular, our previous Trading-Farming game has param-
eters a > c = d > b, and the famous Prisoner-Dilemma
game is another example with b > d > c > a. A game
with a > c and b > d (or a < c and b < d) has no mixed
equilibrium and only one pure equilibrium, then the strategy
evolution will always converge to that pure equilibrium. For
symmetric games with single internal equilibrium, we classify
them into two categories. One category (type I) includes sym-
metric games like Hawk-Dove, which have parameters a < c
and b > d. Another category (type II) includes symmetric
FIG. 1. A contour plot of strategy space of a Trading-Farming game.
FIG. 2. Type I and Type II symmetric game.
games like Trading-Farming, which have parameters a > c
and b < d.
In a type I symmetric game, assuming both players follow
same evolutionary dynamics, if they start at same initial mixed
strategy, their strategies evolve towards the internal equilib-
rium. Otherwise, the player with larger initial share of strat-
egy T ultimately converges to pure strategy T and the other
player converges to pure strategy F. One can deduce the above
properties by the fact that an evolving strategy never moves
across the diagonal x = y in the 2-dimensional strategy space,
due to the symmetric property of evolutionary dynamics, i.e.
vx(x, y) = vy(y, x). Therefore, any unequal strategy pair will
finally converge to either TT or FF through evolution.
The result for type II symmetric games is completely differ-
ent. Let H and D be the choices of strategies, given an internal
equilibrium (x∗, y∗), for any point in the region x > x∗ and
y < y∗, the evolution converges to HD. Within the region
x < x∗ and y > y∗, the evolution converges to DH. For the
other two regions, it can be shown that if a strategy at (x, y)
converges to HD, a point (x−α, y+β) also converges to HD,
for all 0 < α < x , 0 < β < 1− y. Similarly, if a strategy at
(x, y) converges to DH, a point (x+α, y−β) also converges to
DH for all 0 < α < 1−x , 0 < β < y. Combining the results
above, given any evolutionary symmetric gameG under repli-
cator dynamics, the strategy space can be divided into 2 open
regions, where each pure equilibrium lies in each regions, and
the internal equilibrium lies on the boundary. Then any initial
strategy inside a region converges to pure equilibrium con-
3tained in that region, and any strategy located on boundaries
between regions converges to the internal equilibrium.
Notice that replicator dynamics is not the only possible dy-
namical system describing continuous strategy evolution. As
soon as the evolutionary dynamics satisfies adjustment prop-
erty [10] : ddt~x
TA~y ≥ 0, the arguments in this letter follows.
Now we consider quantum evolutionary games which allow
players to use strategies quantum mechanically. In a classical
game, each player has a strategy set S, and the mixed strategy
distribution is represented by probability vector ~p = ~x × ~y.
The expected payoffs are given by uA(~p) =
∑
ij xiyjAij and
uB(~p) =
∑
ij xiyjBij . In a quantum game, each player i
now has a Hilbert space Hi = span{si : si ∈ Si}. A quan-
tum strategy can be represented by a quantum state |ψ〉 =∑
ij
√
xiyj |ij〉. Here a quantum state is a generalization of
classical probability distribution. Given a quantum state |ψ〉,
players receive their payoffs by performing a quantum mea-
surement on computational basis S, where the payoff function
of each player is defined to be uA(|ψ〉) = ∑ij |〈ij|ψ〉|2Aij
and uB(|ψ〉) = ∑ij |〈ij|ψ〉|2Bij . In evolutionary games, a
classical player can shuffle the probability distribution over
her strategy space, a quantum player can perform operation
on quantum state |ψ〉 by applying admissible super-operators
in her local spaceHi.
Since classical and quantum strategies locate in different
strategy space, their evolutionary behaviours would be possi-
bly different. Zhang [13] shows that a quantum equilibrium
strategy |ψ〉 always induces a classical equilibrium distribu-
tion through measurement. More precisely, if |ψ〉 is a quan-
tum Nash equilibrium, then ~p defined by p(s) = |〈s|ψ〉|2 is
essentially a classical Nash equilibrium. Since Nash equilib-
rium is a sufficient condition for a strategy to remain station-
ary under replicator dynamics [4], the above theorem implies
that a quantum equilibrium state |ψ∗〉 always implies a classi-
cal evolutionary fixed point at corresponding position ~p∗ given
by p(s) = |〈s|ψ〉|2.
Now we use quantum replicator dynamics as an example to
illustrate the evolution of non-equilibrium strategy. For clas-
sical replicator dynamics, a player tends to increase the prob-
ability share xi of a particular strategy i only when the payoff
of pure strategy si is higher than the payoff of mixed strategy
~x. The rate of change of xi is proportional to the net increase
of payoff and its share following the expression below:
d~xi
dt
=
∑
jk xjyk(Aik −Ajk)
= xi(u
A(si, ~y)− uA(~x, ~y)) (3)
Assume that Babylonian uses mixed strategy ~y, here we de-
note the expected payoff of Assyrian using pure strategy si
to be uA(si, ~y) =
∑
j Aikyk , and its expected payoff using
mixed strategy ~x to be uA(~x, ~y) =
∑
jk Ajkxjyk. We name
the function v(x)i = u
A(si, y)− uA(x, y) be the partial veloc-
ity of evolutionary strategy si. Then we denote the diagonal
matrix V (x) with V (x)(i, i) = v(x)i to be the velocity operator.
Therefore, ddt~x(t) = V
(x)~x(t).
FIG. 3. Classical (left) and quantum (right) replicator dynamical
evolution in Trading-Farming game.
Consider the evolution of joint strategy ~p = ~x × ~y, since
d
dt~p = ~x× ddt~y + ddt~x× ~y = (I ⊗ V (y) + V (x) ⊗ I)~p = V ~p,
where V = I ⊗ V (y) + V (x) ⊗ I is called the joint velocity
operator which is also a diagonal matrix.
With analog to classical regime, the evolution of quantum
strategy also depends on payoff differences between the target
and current strategies. In this case, the quantum partial veloc-
ity v(x) is given by v(x)i = u
A(|i〉|ψy〉) − uA(|ψ〉), where
|ψy〉 = Trx(|ψ〉). In quantum mechanics, the evolution of a
quantum state is generated by a Hamiltonian H , and the rate
of change of a state is described by Schro¨dinger equation:
i~
d
dt
|ψ〉 = H|ψ〉 (4)
Here the quantum generating function of evolution is given
by −iH/~. Following replicator dynamics, given a quantum
strategy |ψ〉, the Hamiltonian generator H(x) of Assyrian fol-
lowing quantum replicator dynamics is defined as below.
H(x)(|ψ〉) =
∑
i,j,k
− i
h¯
(
uA(|i〉|ψy〉)− uA(|j〉|ψy〉)
)
〈k|ψy〉|i〉〈j|
Then the product Hamiltonian H = I ⊗ H(y) + H(x) ⊗ I
drives quantum strategies of players to evolve, which itself
is state-dependent and thus time-dependent during evolution.
For any later time t > 0, the quantum strategy ρ(t) evolves
based on the initial state |ψ(0)〉 and Hamiltonian generator
H(|ψ〉) according to the following:
|ψ(t)〉 = U(0, t)|ψ(t)〉 = e−
∫ t
0
iH(|ψ(t′)〉)dt′ |ψ(0)〉 (5)
Quantum replicator dynamics is only applicable on quan-
tum strategy but not classical strategy. Different from its
classical counterpart, a quantum strategy may evolve dras-
tically even if its classical counterpart is a dominant pure
equilibrium. For example, consider a 2-player symmetric
game G with payoff matrices A and B define as expression
2. In classical regime, let ~x(t) = (cos2 θ sin2 θ)T and
~y(t) = (cos2 φ sin2 φ)T be the mixed strategy of Assyr-
ian and Babylonian use at time t. For initial strategies ~x(0) =
(cos2 θ0 sin
2 θ0)
T and ~y(0) = (cos2 φ0 sin2 φ0)T . Un-
der classical replicator dynamics, a strategy evolve with time
4as below.
~x(t) = ~x(0) +
∫ t
0
γδ(φ) sin2 θ cos2 θ
[
1
−1
]
dt′ (6)
where δ(θ) = (a − c) cos2 θ + (b − d) sin2 θ and δ(φ) =
(a − c) cos2 φ + (b − d) sin2 φ. The above expressions are
deduced by substituting dθdt = −δ(φ) sin 2θ/4 and dφdt =−δ(θ) sin 2φ/4 into the replicator dynamics expression.
On the other hand, players may employ quantum strate-
gies following quantum replicator dynamics. Let |ψ〉 =
(eiα cos θ e−iα sin θ)T and |ζ〉 = (eiα cosφ e−iα sinφ)T
be the quantum strategies of Assyrian and Babylonian respec-
tively. Their strategy evolutions are governed by the Hamilto-
nian generators HA and HB , where
HA(|ψ〉) =
∑
a,b
γ〈a|ψ〉
(
uA(|a〉|ζ〉)− uA(|b〉|ζ〉)
)
|a〉〈b|
Therefore,
|ψ(t)〉 = e−
∫ t
0
iHAdt
′ |ψ(t)〉
= |ψ(0)〉+
∫ t
0
γδ(φ)
[−e−iα sin θ
eiα cos θ
]
dt′ (7)
Comparing equations 6 and 7, we see that quantum replica-
tor dynamical evolution is different from its classical counter-
part. One significant difference is that, the classical strategy
will converge whenever θ or φ → 0 (which leads to a classi-
cal pure strategy), since sin2 0 = 0 leads to a static evolution;
but the quantum strategy keeps evolving in the complex space
even if θ or φ→ 0.
Particularly, in Prisoner-Dilemma game, a pair of classi-
cal evolving strategies always converge to pure strategy De-
fect, but a pair of evolving quantum strategies keep oscillating
within a cycle and never converge (See figure 4). Such a dif-
ference is due to the Hilbert space of quantum strategy form a
spherical manifold instead of an affine 2D-plane with borders.
When a quantum strategy vector reaches pure strategy Defect,
it keeps moving towards the negative quadrant and never stops
at s. This makes the quantum state evolving in a circular loop
and never converges to any equilibrium.
Previously we consider both players playing quantum
evolving strategies. One may be curious if quantum dynam-
ics provides us some advantages in a unfair game against its
classical counterpart. In iterated Prisoner-Dilemma based on
replicator dynamics, quantum does not provide us any bene-
fit. On the other hand, in Trading-Farming game, regardless
of its less advantageous initial position, employing a quan-
tum replicator dynamics ensures quantum player (Assyrian)
to achieve a better payoffs compared to classical replicator
dynamics (Refer to figure 3 and 4).
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FIG. 4. Classical vs Quantum replicator dynamical evolution
in Prisoner-Dilemma (left) and Trading-Farming (right). Assyrian
employs quantum evolving strategy, Babylonian employs classical
evolving strategy.
[1] Immanuel M. Bomze. Lotka-volterra equations and replicator
dynamics: A two dimensional classification. Biological Cyber-
netics, 48(3):201–211, 1983. DOI:10.1007/BF00318088.
[2] Jens Eisert, Martin Wilkens, and Maciej Lewenstein. Quantum
games and quantum strategies. Physical Review Letters, 1999.
[3] R. A. Fisher. The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection. Claren-
don Press, Oxford, 1930.
[4] D. Friedman. Evolutionary games in economics. Econometrica,
59(3):637–666, 5 1991.
[5] P. Hammerstein and R. Selten. Game theory and evolutionary
biology. Handbook of Game Theory, 2, 1994. Elsevier B.V.
[6] D.A. Meyer. Quantum strategies. Physical Review Letters,
82:1052–1055, 1999.
[7] R. B. Myerson. Game Theory: An Analysis of Conflict. MIT
Press, Cambridge, 1991.
[8] John Maynard Smith. Evolution and the theory of games. Cam-
bridge University Press, 1982.
[9] John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. The logic of animal
conflict. Nature, 246:1518, 11 1973. doi:10.1038/246015a0.
[10] J. Swinkels. Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games.
Games Econ. Behav., 5:455–84, 1993. MR 94b:90112.
[11] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. The Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, 1947.
[12] J. Weibull. Evolutionary Game Theory. Number 96f:90004.
MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995.
[13] SY Zhang. Quantum strategic game theory. The 14th Inter-
national Workshop on Quantum Information Processing, 2011.
(arXiv:1012.5141)
